




BLOCKCHAIN-BASED BATCH AUTHENTICATION PROTOCOL FOR INTERNET OF VEHICLES

ABSTRACT

The vehicles in Internet of Vehicles (IoV) can be used to gather and distribute data in a smart city environment. However, at the same time various security threats arise due to insecure communication among entities in an IoV-based smart city deployment. To address this issue, we aimed to design a novel blockchain-enabled batch authentication scheme in Artificial Intelligence (AI)-envisioned IoV-based smart city deployment. Incorporation of AI/ML in blockchain produces a secure, efficient and intelligent blockchain based system. The proposed authentication scheme implements two types of authentications: **Vehicle to vehicle (V2V) authentication**- that allows a vehicle to authenticate its neighbor vehicles in its cluster; and **batch authentication**- that allows a group of vehicles to be authenticated by RSU simultaneously. Finally, a group key is established between a group of vehicles and RSU for future secure communication. RSU gathers secure data from its vehicles and form several transactions. Nearby fog servers associated with RSU and cloud server form a complete block. The created blocks are mined by the cloud servers in a Peer-to-Peer (P2P) cloud server network through the voting-based Practical Byzantine Fault Tolerance (PBFT) consensus algorithm (Algorithm 1). The authentic and genuine data of the blockchain are utilized for Big data analytics through AI/ML algorithms.

Network Model



Signing & Authentication Phases

Signing Phase	
Vehicle (V_j)	Road-side Unit (RSU_j)/Vehicle (V_j)
Select random $rn_{V_j}, a_{V_j}, b_{V_j} \in Z_q^*$ and current timestamp value TS_{V_j} . Compute $Sig_{V_j} = a_{V_j} \cdot (RID_{V_j} + Pub_{V_j})$, $Sig_{V_j} = b_{V_j} \cdot (pr_{V_j} \cdot G)$, $h_{2j} = H_2(ma_j Sig_{V_j})$, $h_{3j} = H_3(ma_j Sig_{V_j} Sig_{V_j})$, $Prox_{V_j} = H_4(X_k)$. Generate signature as $Sig_{V_j} = (a_{V_j} + h_{2j}) \cdot (pp_{V_j} + pp_{V_j}) + (b_{V_j} + h_{3j}) \cdot pr_{V_j} \cdot Prox_{V_j}$. $Hello_{MSV_j} = \{ma_j, Sig_{V_j}, Sig_{V_j}, Sig_{V_j}\}$ (via public channel)	
V2V Authentication Phase	
Vehicle (V_j)	Vehicle (V_j)
Receive message $Hello_{MSV_j} = \{ma_j, Sig_{V_j}, Sig_{V_j}, Sig_{V_j}\}$. Check if $ TS_{V_j}^* - TS_{V_j} \leq \Delta T$? If valid, verify if $Cert_{V_j} \cdot G = Pub_{TA} + h(RID_{V_j} Pub_{V_j} R_{V_j}) \cdot R_{V_j}$? If legitimate, compute $h_{2j} = H_2(ma_j Sig_{V_j})$, $h_{3j} = H_3(ma_j Sig_{V_j} Sig_{V_j})$, $Prox_{V_j} = H_4(X_k)$. Verify if $e(G, \sum_{j=1}^n w_j Sig_{V_j}) = e(Pub_{TA}, Sig_{V_j} + h_2(RID_{V_j} + Pub_{V_j}) \cdot e(Prox_{V_j}, Sig_{V_j} + h_3 \cdot PB_{V_j}))$? If it is valid, V2V authentication is successful.	
Batch Authentication Phase	
Vehicles V_1, V_2, \dots, V_n	Road-side Unit (RSU_j)
Check if $ TS_{V_j}^* - TS_{V_j} \leq \Delta T$? for all vehicles V_1, V_2, \dots, V_n . If valid, select random $w_1, w_2, \dots, w_n \in Z_q^*$. Compute $h_{2j} = H_2(ma_j Sig_{V_j})$, $h_{3j} = H_3(ma_j Sig_{V_j} Sig_{V_j})$, $Prox_{V_j} = H_4(X_k)$, for all $j = 1, 2, \dots, n$. Verify if $e(G, \sum_{j=1}^n w_j Sig_{V_j}) = e(Pub_{TA}, \sum_{j=1}^n w_j Sig_{V_j} + w_j h_2(RID_{V_j} + Pub_{V_j}) \cdot e(Prox_{V_j}, \sum_{j=1}^n w_j Sig_{V_j} + w_j \cdot h_3 \cdot PB_{V_j}))$? If it is valid, batch authentication is successful, and all the vehicles V_1, V_2, \dots, V_n in the cluster are authenticated (by RSU_j).	

Group Key Management Phase

Group Key Management Phase	
Vehicles (V_j)	Road-side Unit (RSU_j)
Generate a $rn_{RSU}, sk \in Z_q^*$ timestamp value TS_{RSU} . Compute $RN_{RSU} = rn_{RSU} \cdot G$. Generate group key $GK_k = h(RID_{V_1} RID_{V_2} \dots RID_{V_n} rn_{V_1} rn_{V_2} \dots rn_{V_n} Cert_{V_1} Cert_{V_2} \dots Cert_{V_n} RID_{RSU} rn_{RSU} RN_{RSU} pr_{RSU})$. Encrypted group key $E_{PB_{V_j}}(GK_k rn_{V_j} TS_{RSU})$. Form message $mb_j = \{TS_{RSU}, Cert_{RSU}, Pub_{RSU}, PB_{RSU}, RN_{RSU}, Pub_{TA}, rn_{V_j}, E_{PB_{V_j}}(GK_k rn_{V_j} TS_{RSU})\}$. signature $Sig_{RSU, V_j} = pr_{RSU} + h(mb_j RN_{RSU} Cert_{V_j} RID_{V_j} TS_{V_j} TS_{RSU}) \cdot rn_{RSU} \pmod{q}$. $Res_{RSU, V_j} = \{mb_j, Sig_{RSU, V_j}\}$	
Check if $ TS_{RSU}^* - TS_{RSU} \leq \Delta T$? If valid check $Cert_{RSU} \cdot G = Pub_{TA} + h(RID_{RSU} RN_{RSU} Cert_{V_1} Cert_{V_2} \dots Cert_{V_n} RID_{RSU} rn_{RSU} pr_{RSU}) \cdot R_{RSU}$? Verify the signature by $Sig_{RSU, V_j} \cdot G = PB_{RSU} + h(mb_j RN_{RSU} Cert_{V_j} RID_{V_j} TS_{V_j} TS_{RSU}) \cdot RN_{RSU}$? If valid extract group key by $(GK_k rn_{V_j} TS_{RSU}) = D_{pr_{V_j}}[E_{PB_{V_j}}(GK_k rn_{V_j} TS_{RSU})]$ Check if $rn_{V_j} = rn_{V_j}$ and $TS_{RSU}^* = TS_{RSU}$? If both are valid, the group key GK_k is authentic. All vehicles V_1, V_2, \dots, V_n and RSU in their cluster share the group key GK_k	

Blockchain Consensus Algorithm

Algorithm 1 Consensus for block verification and addition in blockchain

Input: A full block, $FullBlock = \{BVer, PBHash, TS_{Block}, MTR_{Block}, PB_{RSU}, \{Tx_i | i = 1, 2, \dots, n_i\}, Sig_{Block}, CBHash\}$; private-public key pairs $(pr_{CS_n}, Pub_{CS_n} = pr_{CS_n} \cdot G)$ of all other cloud servers CS_n in the P2P CS network; n_{LC} : number of faulty cloud servers (nodes) in the P2P CS network.

Output: Commitment for block addition.

- LC generates a random number $rn_{LC} \in Z_q^*$, a current timestamp TS_{LC} and a voting request $VReq_{LC}$.
- for each peer cloud server node CS_n do
- LC encrypts rn_{LC}, TS_{LC} and $VReq_{LC}$ using the ECC-based encryption algorithm with the help of the public key Pub_{CS_n} of CS_n as $EncVReq = E_{PB_{CS_n}}[rn_{LC}, TS_{LC}, VReq_{LC}]$ and sends a block verification request message $\{FullBlock, EncVReq, TS_{LC}\}$ to CS_n via open channel.
- end for
- for each follower node CS_n in the P2P CS network do
- Let the message $\{FullBlock, EncVReq, TS_{LC}\}$ be received at time TS_{LC}^* by CS_n .
- CS_n checks validity of TS_{LC} by the condition: $|TS_{LC}^* - TS_{LC}| \leq \Delta T$.
- If timestamp is valid then
- CS_n decrypts $EncVReq$ using its own private key pr_{CS_n} to retrieve $[rn_{LC}, TS_{LC}, VReq_{LC}] = DP_{pr_{CS_n}}[EncVReq]$.
- if $TS_{LC}^* = TS_{LC}$ then
- CS_n verifies MTR_{Block}, Sig_{Block} and $CBHash$ on the block $FullBlock$.
- if all the verifications by CS_n are successful then
- CS_n sends a voting response cum block verification status message $\{EP_{Pub_{CS_n}}[rn_{LC}, VReq_{LC}, VRep_{CS_n}, VerStat_{CS_n}]\}$ to the leader LC , where $VRep_{CS_n}$ and $VerStat_{CS_n}$ are the voting response corresponding to $VReq_{LC}$ and block verification status, respectively.
- end if
- end if
- end if
- Initialize $VCount = 0$, where $VCount$ represents the number of valid votes.
- for each voting response cum block verification status message $\{EP_{Pub_{CS_n}}[rn_{LC}, VRep_{CS_n}, VerStat_{CS_n}]\}$ from the follower peer nodes CS_n do
- LC decrypts the message using its own private key pr_{LC} to retrieve $[rn_{LC}, VRep_{CS_n}, VerStat_{CS_n}] = DP_{pr_{LC}}[EP_{Pub_{CS_n}}[rn_{LC}, VRep_{CS_n}, VerStat_{CS_n}]]$.
- if $(rn_{LC} = rn_{LC})$ and $(VRep_{CS_n} = valid)$ and $(VerStat_{CS_n} = valid)$ then
- Set $VCount = VCount + 1$.
- end if
- end for
- if $(VCount \geq 2 * n_{LC} + 1)$ then
- Add the block $FullBlock$ to the blockchain.
- Broadcast commitment message to the P2P CS network.
- end if

Results

SUMMARY	SUMMARY
SAFE	SAFE
DETAILS	DETAILS
BOUNDED_NUMBER_OF_SESSIONS	BOUNDED_NUMBER_OF_SESSIONS
TYPED_MODEL	TYPED_MODEL
PROTOCOL	PROTOCOL
/home/palak/Desktop/span	/home/palak/Desktop/span
/testsuite/results/batch.if	/testsuite/results/batch.if
GOAL	GOAL
As specified	as specified
BACKEND	BACKEND
CL-AS3	CM3C
STATISTICS	STATISTICS
Analysed : 844 states	TIME 168 ms
Reachable : 64 states	parseTime 0 ms
Translation: 0.35 seconds	visitedNodes: 16 nodes
Computation: 0.01 seconds	depth: 4 plies